CIA Hired Swiss Nuclear Weapons Dealers

The Swiss destroyed documents that could have put three nuclear weapons smugglers behind bars. Why? Because of the CIA, of course.

What is behind a statement made by Swiss President Pascal Couchepin about the government destroying computer files that connected a family of engineers with the sales and smuggling of nuclear material to Libya and Iran?

Abdul Qadeer Khan is a Pakistani engineer. At first he was involved in the production of nuclear bombs and then became a black market salesman. The destroyed documents connected Khan with father and sons Tinner, Swiss engineers who were accused of mediating between Khan and rogue states in search of nuclear material. According to the Swiss president, the documents contained blueprints of nuclear weapons and technologies needed to produce such weapons.

But in order to answer the question put forth in the first sentence, one needs to know that the nuclear programme in Libya was ceased and Khan’s atomic material smuggling network destroyed, or at least that is what officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has a leading role in the whole story, claim.

It seems the USA is dealing with terrorists after all 

The documents were destroyed at the request of the United States government, the officials confirmed in Bush’s Oval Office, so that they do not fall into the wrong hands or reveal the relationship between the USA and Tinners, a family that seems to have counter-intelligence aspirations.

In the past four years the CIA paid over 10 million dollars to the Tinners for information about the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programme and for the destruction of Khan’s ‘enterprise’.

Through the CIA’s relationship with the Tinners, the American secret service arrived to information that Iran began to enrich their uranium, which meant a start of the campaign against Ahmadinejad’s project.

But as it revealed this information, the CIA admits that some concessions had to be made and that at one time the entire operation had been jeopardised, including the lives of everybody involved, especially the Tinners. Fear reared its head in particular when the whole thing ended up in Swiss court – the disclosure of documents could have connected the U.S. government with terrorist groups and nuclear weapons trade, more so because their non-existence meant the Tinners’ freedom. But a lack of evidence caused them not to become involved in the case.

The CIA dubbed the operation “a complete intelligence success”, American media say.

The almighty dollar reforms even rogue nuclear physicists 

But European security services are not so happy. They are concerned and expect that the destruction of documents further concealed traces that could lead to other Khan’s customers and getting any new traces was made infinitely more difficult.

The Tinners will not help a great deal in any further investigation, since they have been bound to secrecy. Even if they have not, why would somebody who escaped the guillotine want to put their heads on the executioner’s slab?

The history of involvement of the Tinners in the international spy network began in the 1970s when the father, Friedrich Tinner, an innovator and mechanical engineer, began working in Swiss companies on dual “vacuum” atomic technology that could also be used in peace-time nuclear projects, as well as war-time projects.

Friedrich soon connected with Khan with whose help he produced atomic fuel for the Pakistani nuclear arsenal until the early 1990’s. Then his sons joined in and they worked on a secret Libyan nuclear programme.

At the start of the new century, European intelligence officers say, the CIA approached the older son, Urs, and hired him as an informant. Urs talked his younger brother and father into cooperating and a new stage in their lives began – developing a nuclear programme in Malaysia, with the cooperation of Khan, the Tinners gave information to the CIA.

All ends well fast 

But that was equally the beginning of the end, since Malaysian authorities identified all three as Khan’s chief assistants, after which they were arrested and extradited to Switzerland. This is when all their business documents started to be thoroughly checked and the blueprints and plans were found.

Later a connection between the CIA and the Tinners was discovered and in 2005 Switzerland started asking questions about their relationship, which ended in an admission and the public learning about the whole story.

The CIA decided to protect the Tinners, for selfish motives, of course, according to the officials. If the prosecution of a key informant was permitted, what kind of a message would that send to other “employees”?

On the other hand, had evidence of their connection not been found too early or had they never existed and had the case not have been so public, would the CIA be acting so protective?